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 The international system has been under the influence of United States hegemony since 
the fall of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century; however, in the past several years the 
strength of the hegemon has come into question. With the strength of the United States 
hegemony in question, the possibility of successors also comes into question. Although no 
current, clear-cut proof exists that China has the full potential to surpass the United States as the 
hegemon, China has shown the most potential of any single state. Most of this potential is due to 
China’s large and ever-growing economy. With the possibility of American decline and Sino 
power rising, a fresh look needs to be taken at Power Transition Theory (PTT).  
Regardless if China, or another state power, one day surpasses the United States as 
hegemon, transitioning away from a unipole has never occurred in the current international 
system. This requires special scrutiny when determining the possible outcomes of a transition. A 
new outlook on this theory is necessary because of the dawn of the Cyber Age. Cyber security 
and cyber warfare are going to play a major role in determining the results of the transition. The 
possibility of conflict revolves mostly around the how the challenger favors the current status 
quo, as dictated by the hegemon, or how willing the current hegemon is to concede its global 
status to the challenger. Previously, considering this possibility of conflict looked upon the status 
of each state’s conventional military power: conventional weapons, man power, nuclear 
weapons. However, in the Cyber Age, conventional military power is not the only power that 
must be considered. China and the United States are two of the states that are most accused of 
international cyber attacks. Although never proven, the United States has been accused of 
helping to orchestrate the first-known intentional cyber attack, the Stuxnet virus, a topic that will 
be later discussed. However, both states are accused of daily cyber espionage against one another 
and others in the international system. This new and evolving power must be taken into 
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consideration when determining the outcome of an international power transition. This paper will 
argue that these cyber attacks will decrease the probability of an armed conflict and will be cause 
for a more peaceful transition. This paper will examine the effects of cyber warfare on PTT, as 
well as take into consideration possible other factors that could cause for a more peaceful 
transition. Along with the consideration of the effects of cyber warfare on PTT, a necessary look 
must be made at the effects of cyber warfare on Just War Theory (JWT). I will examine both of 
these effects as they concern the overall Sino-American relationship and the outcome of a 
possible power transition. 
 The current Sino-American relationship has most recently been defined by their 
economic trading partnership. According to federal census information, China is, and has been, 
the number one state that the United States has imported from, as well as the number one state 
that the United States has a trade deficit with.1 This economic partnership mostly stems from the 
U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 signed by then President Bill Clinton. The act allowed China 
to surpass Mexico as the United States’ number two trading partner by 20062, and by November 
2015, China has surpassed Canada to become the United States’ number one trading partner.3 
Similarly, the United States has moved into the position of number one trading partner for 
China.4 If only viewed through an economic lens, the Sino-American relationship is very strong 
and would seem to deter any sort of conflict in a power transition. If a conflict were to occur, 
both states would take significant losses economically. The United States would lose nearly 28% 
of its imported goods,5 and China would lose approximately $423 billion or approximately 19% 
of its overall revenue from exports. This also doesn’t take into consideration possible embargoes 
from each state’s military alliances, which would only further the economic losses for each state. 
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Although each state would take a significant hit economically during the conflict, special 
consideration needs to be taken of the large trade deficit that the United States has with China.  
 The possibility of conflict is highest during a power transition when the challenger 
reaches the condition of parity. The period of parity is defined as beginning when the challenger 
develops more than 80% of the resources of the dominant power and ends when the challenger 
exceeds the dominant power by 20%.6 The growing trade imbalance of the United States is 
beginning to signify an increase in Chinese ability to produce its own many of its own resources. 
The United States at the end of 2015 had a trade imbalance of $365.7 billion with China. 
Although the United States does have a trade imbalance with its top eleven trade partners, the 
next highest imbalance is only 7$4.2 billion to Germany.7 However, the trade imbalance with 
China has grown much more rapidly than any other state. If China continues to grow this trade 
imbalance, it may eventually enter the period of parity in which the United States would need to 
take a serious consideration of its trade imbalance if the state desired to maintain its position as 
hegemon.  
 However, there is other speculation that parity and overall economic prowess may not 
play as large a part in causing a power struggle. Preceding the First World War, the United States 
passed the United Kingdom in terms of the world’s greatest economy.8 Nonetheless, the United 
States did not become a great power in the international system until after the Second World 
War, a conflict that the United States and the United Kingdom were on the same side of. Part of 
this could be due to the United Kingdom’s vast empire. But once the United Kingdom became 
the net borrower of the United States, the British Empire only lasted approximately another 
quarter of a century.9 A similar effect could possibly occur if China surpasses the United States. 
United States has already become the net borrower of China; could the United States already be 
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in a position of decline without realizing it? The United Kingdom still continued through WWI, 
the interwar period, and most of WWII as the dominant power in the world, even though the 
system was more multipolar in nature than a hegemonic system. Other factors could have played 
a serious role in this as well, such as the United States’ position of isolationism. The United 
States only entered WWI as a necessity to ensure the survival of Europe as a whole, and only 
entered WWII because of the preventive Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although China was 
involved in an ideological proxy war with the United States during the Korean and Vietnamese 
Wars, since the end of the Cold War, China has mostly focused on economic relationships, not 
getting overly involved in conflicts in the Middle East or elsewhere. In fact most of the Chinese 
involvement, even during the Cold War, was based around the nation-building problems it faces 
today, not international conflicts. The current Sino-American situation shares these aspects with 
the previous British-American power transition; however, a major difference in the current 
situation is ideology. 
 The British-American transition occurred smoothly between the two countries. Although 
both countries were involved in a conflict during the time of transition, the two powers were 
clearly fighting on the same side of WWII. Many factors of WWII could have played into the 
transition. Britain came out of the war severely weakened and could not contest the United States 
even if it had wanted to maintain its position of power. Additionally, ideology played a major 
role in this transition. Although Britain likely did not want to give up its position of power, the 
United States had been a longtime ally of the British and shared the same core ideology of 
democracy. However in the possible Sino-American transition ideological similarities do not 
exist. The two states do share the strong economic ties, but China is still a communist country 
with a very opaque government and a highly-contested recent history of human rights violations; 
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all of which go against a core national interest of the United States. According the Robert Art, 
the United States has six core national interests: protect the homeland from attacks; keep the 
peace amongst Eurasian powers; preserve a stable supply and access to oil; preserve an open 
international economic order; spread democracy, the rule of law, and protect human rights; and 
avert climate change.10 It is highly unlikely the United States would willingly allow for China to 
attempt to spread its ideology even if the United States was weakened by a conflict. Although 
there are now international organizations, such as the United Nations, that attempt to remedy 
these human rights violations, it is unlikely any of them could successfully deter against a 
unipole, as seen by the lack of effect of the United Nations’ condemnation of the United States 
conflict in Iraq in 2003. 
Although China and the United States have enjoyed a strong trading partnership, other 
aspects of international relations have not produced as strong of a relationship, which may cause 
China to attempt to change the status quo regardless of economic ties. One major area of 
dissidence is China’s disagreement with the United States’ policies in the Middle East. China has 
disagreed with the United States’ involvement in the Middle East since the early 1990s. It is a 
general belief in China that the United States only got involved in the Middle East to extend its 
hegemony and secure a steady supply of oil. Most recently China accused the United States of 
this after the 2003 United States backing of regime change in Iraq.11 China believes that the 2003 
invasion of Iraq and subsequent ousting of Saddam Hussein were merely a ploy to create another 
democratic government in the Middle East, giving the United States more control and power 
over the region. The United States has vehemently denied these accusations and has some 
credibility to do so, as the number one state that the United States imports isn’t a member of the 
Middle East or even of OPEC. The number one exporter of oil to the United States is its 
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neighbor to the North, Canada. China on the other hand relies heavily on the Middle East to 
obtain its oil. Saudi Arabia comes in at number one for China on the oil imports list. Although 
Saudi Arabia does come in as number two on the United States list of oil imports, it only makes 
up for 11% of total oil imports. Canada makes up 40% of total oil imports, and the top five is 
rounded out by Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia making up 9%, 8%, and 4% respectively.12 
China does import a similar amount of oil from Saudi Arabia, approximately 16%, but relies on 
the Middle East as a region much more heavily. The countries of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Iran, 
UAE, and Kuwait make up a combined 51% of China’s oil imports. China’s other major sources 
of oil come from Angola, 13%, Russia, 11%, and Venezuela, 4%.13 With such a heavy reliance 
on Middle East oil, China needs to have a serious stake in the Middle East, more so than the 
United States. 
If China is to enter the period of parity, it needs to ensure that it has control over the 
resources that it desires. If the United States continues to obtain this foothold in the Middle East, 
China may run itself dry of oil. As of 2015, China was producing approximately 4.25 million 
barrels per day with a consumption of almost 11million barrels per day.14 Simple math shows 
that China is importing to make up approximately 6.75 million barrels of oil per day. If China 
were to lose its source of Middle East oil because of a conflict with the United States, it would 
lose the aforementioned 51% of imported oil and would fall approximately 3.37 million barrels 
of oil short per day. Although the United States has been involved in the Middle East for the past 
couple decades, it does not mean that the Middle East welcomes the United States. As a region, 
they have a mere 30% favorability view.15 However, because the two states have invested 
themselves so heavily in the region, whether politically or economically, the Middle East will 
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likely become a region of contention between China and the United States in coming years if 
China wants to become the hegemon.  
According to Alterman and Garver, China has two goals in the Middle East, expand 
friendly cooperation with all countries and obtain resources (mainly oil) and export markets.16 
Both of these goals can likely be accomplished through economic relationships. China has taken 
similar steps on the continent of Africa. China recognized the growing financial crisis that was 
affecting the West and took this time to make massive deals and transactions with African 
countries. In 2008, Beijing provided a stimulus package of $570 billion to the continent.17 
Although this stimulus package only strengthened Africa’s dependence on commodities, it 
provided the necessary money to industrialize and increase mining production of the minerals 
that China required. By 2009, China’s largest portion of FDI in Africa was mining at 29.2% of 
total FDI.18 This investment into the continent has provided resources and political power for 
China.  
China could very easily duplicate this process in the Middle East. The financial crisis in 
the West has since become much less of a problem, but China could still easily capitalize in the 
Middle East. As mentioned before, the Middle East’s approval rating of the United States sits at 
a measly 30%, and China has already begun taking advantage of this. Unlike the United States 
which has been taking action in the Middle East for the past several decades to attempt to spread 
democracy and end the reign of dictators in the region, China has simply just had to verbally 
condemn the United States’ actions to gain influence. China has denounced these actions by 
saying that it opposes outside states having influence and interventions in the region.19 If China is 
capable of duplicating the process from Africa, it will likely look to Iraq first. Iraq has the fourth 
largest proven petroleum deposits, but the oil fields are underutilized.20 Iraq does not have the 
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technological capabilities or funds to drill at full potential. China could easily duplicate the 
African process to aide Iraq in drilling for the oil and obtaining a vital resource for itself. 
Although this would only make China more reliant on Middle East oil, it would most likely have 
a much higher approval rating than the United States in the country.  
China, however, must be very careful if it attempts to assert itself into the Middle East. 
The Middle East could very easily become a flashpoint between the United States and China, 
which would hurt China in two different ways. First, the United States has proven since the end 
of the Second World War that it is willing to bog itself down in conflicts over ideology. The 
Chinese should be aware of this because of the ideological proxy war in Korea that had the 
United States and China on opposite sides. In recent years, the United States has proven its 
willingness to continue this trend after the ten-year stint in Iraq for the spread of an ideology and 
the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Second, China has to realize that a majority of its 
influence in the region is because of the stance it took on the United States’ interventions. If 
China goes back on its position of no outside intervention, the Middle East could very quickly 
view China in the same light that the region views the United States, which would set China back 
even further.  
China has proven that the Middle East is not its main concern. When President Bush and 
the rest of Washington, D.C., called on Beijing to assist in the War on Terror in the early 2000s, 
China attempted to leverage the situation. China originally said it would support the coalition if 
the United States provided concessions for Taiwan.21 One of China’s main goals currently is its 
regional influence in the Southeast Pacific, but the main problem lies with the United States’ 
Seventh Naval Fleet stationed mainly in Japan. The United States pushed its way across the 
Pacific during WWII to fight the Japanese and has not removed itself from the region since. 
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According to the official fact sheet of the Seventh Naval Fleet, its purpose is to “maintain a 
continuous forward presence in the Indo-Asia Pacific, providing security and stability in the 
region.”18 The Seventh Fleet is also the largest of the United States Navy’s forward-deployed 
fleets, which allows it to quickly react to possible conflicts in the region. China has reacted to 
this in recent years by creating “anti-access/area-denial” strategy to limit the naval power of the  
United States.22 The strategy is to prevent the United States from even being able to get its fleet 
close enough to China’s mainland to use its aircraft, let alone any sort of troop or naval 
bombardments. China is also attempting to increase its maritime power in the area. Although the 
United States has official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and not 
Taiwan, it is still a major issue of tension between the two powers and could be another possible 
flashpoint.  
One such instance of this tension in the South China Seas was the incident involving the 
USNS Impeccable, a small ship that is used to detect and track submarines. In 2009 the USNS 
Impeccable was stationed approximately 75 miles off the coast of the Chinese island Yulin to 
monitor movements of a new class of Chinese nuclear submarines.23 The USNS Impeccable 
began to be harassed by Chinese ships even as it began to leave the area. The Chinese attempted 
to capture the towed sonar array of the USNS Impeccable until the United States sent a destroyer 
to the scene to escort the USNS Impeccable. The United States claimed that the ship was 
operating outside Chinese territorial waters. China claimed that foreign military ships were only 
allowed in the economic boundaries (approximately 200 hundred miles from shore) if their 
business was innocent in nature, and China did not consider the USNS Impeccable to be 
conducting innocent procedures.24 Although this event may not have escalated into a naval 
conflict, this incident could have escalated tensions that could have affected political and 
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economic relationships between the two states. The amount of surveillance the United States and 
China conduct on one another is reminiscent of the United States and the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War. Regardless, China risked a lot by being so aggressive towards a surveillance-only 
ship. Although intelligence is very important in the military world, how much would China risk 
if it had been a United States ship with stronger military capabilities in its waters? And how 
much would China risk when it comes to Taiwan?  
Overall the United States has been very critical of Chinese nation building. China has 
multiple concerns when it comes to unifying as one. China’s main concerns for unification 
include Taiwan, Tibet, and the Muslim Uighurs. The United States officially switched its 
recognition of the Chinese government from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China on 
January 1, 1979. On this date the United States officially terminated the Sino-American Mutual 
Defense Treaty as well, since the treaty was created with the government in Taipei not the 
government in Beijing. Ever since then, there has still been speculation on whether or not the 
United States would defend Taiwan if China attempted to invade the island. On April 10th, 1979, 
President Carter signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act that includes provisions for the United 
States to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character […] to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capacity.”25 This does not call for direct protection if there is an invasion 
of Taiwan, but it also does not specify that the United States will not provide defense against 
China. As the hegemon, the United States has interfered in similar capacities elsewhere and 
could very easily do so in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.  
Taiwan isn’t the only area of nation building that has brought criticism to China. China 
also has a problem with Tibet and the Muslim Uighurs. China illegally invaded Tibet in 1950 
and has held it under occupation ever since. The West has since recognized Chinese sovereignty 
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over Tibet, but many charges of human rights violations have been made including genocide, 
which the United States and the West have intervened to stop before in other conflicts. China 
also has a major ethnic problem in the province of Xinjiang. Culturally the Uighurs that make up 
a majority of this province relate more to Central Asian countries than to China. In recent years 
there has been a large spark in violence amongst the Uighurs and the Han Chinese who are 
moving into the region. Many of the Uighurs claim discrimination, and a separatist movement 
has begun. China’s nation building problem is a major one, and if the human rights violations 
continue, the West may attempt to interfere diplomatically, which could spark a conflict and a 
possible power transition.  
A major hurdle that China would need to cross on its path through power transition 
would be the technological gap with the United States. Although China is moving closer and 
closer to surpassing the United States economically, it is merely exporting these new 
technologies, not creating new ones. The economic prowess of China has not translated into 
military prowess and technological prowess as it once did. According to World Bank data from 
2013, the United States turned in $128 billion worth of receipts for innovation technologies; 
whereas, China turned in less than $1 billion worth.26 Another indicator of technological prowess 
is the number of triadic patents; these are patents that are registered in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan. In 2012, the United States registered nearly 14,000 patents; whereas, China registered 
fewer than 2,000 patents.27 Other indicators include examining the number of articles in science 
and engineering that appear in the top one percent of citations and number of Nobel Prizes won 
in science categories. The United States accounts for almost half of the papers in the top one 
percent of citations, eight times more than China, and has 114 Nobel Prizes in science since 
1990, while China has two.28  
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Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth in their article “The Once and Future 
Superpower” use these facts to argue that China is not approaching the United States 
economically and will not surpass the United States as the hegemon. However, these facts do not 
necessarily correlate with degrees of technological prowess. The authors fail to consider the role 
of globalization and how it affects the spread of new technologies. Although globalization does 
not affect the spread of all technologies, due to the classified nature of many government 
technologies, it can account for the spread of many everyday technologies. Globalization and 
technology go hand-in-hand. Globalization leads to the spread to the spread of technology, and 
better technology leads to more globalization. Much of this occurs not through state governments 
but through transnational corporations that operate outside governments. Although these 
technologies may not originate inside China, this does not mean China will not eventually obtain 
these technologies.  
A major edge the United States has over China is its military prowess. The United States 
has had the strongest military and largest military expenditure for the past several decades, due 
mostly to its arms race with the former Soviet Union. China is catching up in quality of military 
technologies due to globalization. As stated, globalization does not help the spread of classified 
technologies of other states, but it does help the spread of technology that can be used to obtain 
said classified technologies. Cyber espionage and cyber warfare have revolutionized the 
international sphere, and the effects of this have yet to be considered in many International 
Relations theories. Thus far this paper has examined the relationship between the United States 
and China and how it affects the current method of examination for PTT; however, PTT was 
written several decades ago before this technological revolution. Cyber espionage and cyber 
warfare have already had profound effects on the international sphere as a whole, but its full 
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power has yet to be seen. Similarly the effects have yet to be seen on PTT. The abilities of cyber 
warfare allow for the curtailing of many conventional military operations and could potentially 
lead to the mitigation of conflict in a power transition scenario. Many arguments have been made 
that new world economic ties and military capabilities, such as nuclear warheads and democracy, 
have led to sustained peace, which would also affect the possible conflict in PTT, but cyber 
warfare also needs to be considered.  
The capabilities of cyber warfare are countless: “everything from online protests to the 
stealing of internet secrets to cyber sabotage of nuclear research to battlefield acts of war.”29 As 
the world becomes more dependent on new technologies, the capabilities of cyber warfare will 
become endless. Militaries, utility grids, classified documents, identities, and countless more 
areas of our lives are stored or controlled digitally. For example, the United States has been 
deemed very difficult to invade due to the two large oceans on either side of its borders. But this 
only takes into consideration ground troops. Another consideration is the ability for other states 
to prelude invasions through cyber warfare. The ability to wipe out power grids, missile 
defenses, and opposing military capabilities makes such a ground invasion possible. Although 
countries like the United States definitely have cybersecurity to counterattack such measures, the 
possibility of being attacked is much more real.  
The capabilities of cyber warfare can be seen through the 2010 discovery of the Stuxnet 
virus. The virus is believed to have originated from a joint American-Israeli operation. The virus 
was the most advanced malware known. The virus was active for approximately two years as the 
code dictated its own deletion on June 24th, 2012. The virus was created to attack only specific 
computers and was only spread to a set amount of computers. The virus was more than likely 
transferred through USB flash drives. Once inserted into a computer, the virus would search for a 
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Windows operating system; if found the next step was to look for either Siemens PCS7, WINCC, 
or Step7, all different software applications with industrial applications. Once done checking 
these criteria, the virus would spread to up to three computers on the same server. The target of 
the virus is believed to have been the Bushehr or Natanz nuclear facilities in Iran. Although the 
true target has never been confirmed, it is believed the virus was successful in attacking the 
Natanz nuclear power plant causing centrifuges to vibrate rapidly, thus damaging them and 
requiring replacements. The virus was successful in that it reached and destroyed centrifuges; 
however, it did not actually stop any uranium enrichment in Iran. The true effects of the Stuxnet 
virus are in the proven capabilities of cyber warfare. No malware has ever been as effective or 
secretive as this virus. By limiting the computers affected, the malware was much harder to 
detect and allowed for the completion of its mission. Similarly the fact that the Stuxnet virus is 
only believed to be of American-Israeli origin and has not been proven, shows how difficult is to 
defend against these types of attacks. Cyber warfare is silent but can be just as effective as 
conventional warfare.  
The Stuxnet virus is a specific example of a SCADA attack. SCADA stands for 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, a fancy term that means it is a type of industrial 
control system, which in turn simply means it monitors and controls physical industrial 
processes. SCADA servers are much more customized and require more complex codes and 
viruses,30 hence the advanced nature of the Stuxnet Virus. SCADA attacks could easily target 
electrical power grids, communications, and the flow of petroleum.31 Although no known 
SCADA attack on a power grid has occurred, the effects of such an attack can be seen in the 
2003 major blackout of a large portion of the eastern United States and part of Canada. The 
blackout was caused by a chain of events that started with a simple software failure at a local 
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power plant that led to a local outage. The outage led to a strain on other local power plants that 
caused lines to sag and come into contact with trees, which in turn caused these lines to fail as 
well. After this the entire state of Ohio began drawing power from Michigan. Michigan’s power 
grid was unable to sustain the load and began to fail in turn which led to power being drawn 
from more stations along the east coast causing failure after failure. In the end, 256 power plants 
were offline, and 55 million customers were without power.32 A simple software failure and 
human failure to communicate led to one of the largest blackouts in history. If an attack on this 
grid had been intentional, much more damage could have been accomplished and loss of life 
could have occurred, especially if other utilities had been targeted as well. Although SCADA 
systems are highly customized, it is not difficult to obtain information on these systems, and 
attacks on such systems could cripple a state without sending in one ground troop.  
Cyber warfare also allows covert activities to be done in a brand new manner. Covert 
activities no longer completely rely on infiltrating foreign governments by use of humans or 
double agents. Stealing of classified documents, eavesdropping, and denial of service attacks are 
some examples of cyber espionage. Although China appears to have been very successful in 
recent years in stealing highly classified military secrets, cyber espionage can also target large 
corporations. China is known to have cloned products, especially military products; they have 
cloned “bleeding edge U.S. aircraft including the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and 
Northrop Grumman X-47B unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV),”33 as well as several land 
vehicles and small arms. China also clones products on much smaller scales: sandals, 
smartphones, alcoholic beverage, even some stores and restaurants. Cyber espionage has allowed 
for all of this. Although globalization would likely have led to some of this duplication, cyber 
espionage has allowed for much quicker advancement and creation of these products. Militarily 
17 
 
cloning was very difficult before cyber espionage due to needing the actual product to duplicate 
rather than retrofitting older products. 
Another category of cyber warfare is Computer Network Attacks (CNAs). CNAs are 
defined as “actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and 
networks themselves.”34 CNAs are the attacks that everyday citizens often consider when 
thinking of a hacker. Although hackers can create CNAs on a very small scale, the real danger 
comes from the capabilities of the state or state-backed entities. Along with a larger scale of 
attacks, the attacking state would likely “go for the throat,”35 similar to a conventional attack. 
When non-state backed hackers commit CNAs, they only compromise the target in order to own 
it but do not take the full steps that may be required in actual warfare. For example, a hacker may 
break into a missile tracking system to gain access, but the hacker would not destroy or render 
the tracking system useless, unless it was a true act of war. 
Cyber warfare also has profound effects on conflicts of conventional warfare. Cyber 
warfare can affect conventional warfare through two different categories: physically and 
electronically. Physically, cyber warfare effects troops on the ground. Some examples include 
the reliance of troops on new-age electronic technologies, supplies, and communications. Cyber 
attacks could occur against any or all of these categories which would render the troops to be less 
effective. A cyber attack that takes out an enemy’s targeting systems or weapons leaves them 
unable to fight; take out their supply lines and they are unable to survive; take out their 
communications and they are suddenly alone. All of these are extremely detrimental to troops on 
the ground. However, these troops on the ground can prevent cyber attacks as well. Physical 
attacks can be carried out on power grids, communication lines, and other required processes to 
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keep computers powered and running. Without these the enemy may not be able to successfully 
utilize their cyber warfare capabilities. 
The category of electronic warfare, just like physical warfare, can be affected by cyber 
warfare and can affect cyber warfare. Electronic warfare can be considered a subset of 
conventional warfare but is separate from the physical attacks.36 Electronic warfare consists of 
attacks that take place on the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic warfare can render cyber 
capabilities useless through the use of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMPs destroy 
electronics, which would also render much of an enemy’s infrastructure useless without a single 
physical blow. However EMPs and other technologies are themselves electronic, meaning that 
these weapons are just as susceptible to cyber attack. 
Although cyber warfare is relatively new, states have already created defenses against 
these types of weapons. Many of these defenses fall into the realm of cybersecurity. States have 
people actively working to defend against these attacks. Whether its preventively, such as 
building firewalls, or reactively, such as stopping an occurring attack or espionage, cybersecurity 
is an ongoing occurrence that does not contain a method of deterrence like conventional warfare. 
Unfortunately, cybersecurity does not defend against conventional attacks against cyber 
capabilities. States have mainly two option to defend their cyber capabilities from conventional 
attacks, redundant infrastructure and hardening of facilities and equipment.  
Redundant infrastructure consists of three types of backup sites: cold, warm, and hot. 
Cold sites are nothing more than a facility in which to renew operations. Utilities may need to be 
turned on, backup copies of data created and transported, building systems, etc.37 Cold backup 
sites exist mainly in case of conditions that can be seen far into the future as it takes weeks or 
more to bring cold sites online. Warm backup sites are the next step up. Warm sites may have 
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some portion of the software and hardware as well as some systems and some connectivity, but 
backups would still need to be transported to the site and some configurations would need to take 
place.38 It would only take a matter of days to bring a warm site online making these much more 
effective in case of a sudden attacks. Lastly, hot backup sites are completely redundant to an 
active site. This allows for almost zero data loss in case of an attack. Hot backup sites only 
require the personnel needed to run the site to begin operations, which can usually happen in a 
matter of hours.39 All of these backup sites serve their own purposes, but overall each keeps the 
state’s cyber capabilities protected and ready to resume operation in case of a conventional 
attack.  
Facility and equipment hardening is similar to creating firewalls in cybersecurity. 
Hardening against conventional attacks is used to attempt to stop destruction of a state’s cyber 
capabilities. In general hardening of structures and equipment refers to protection against EMPs. 
Although conventional attacks also include small arms and bombs, the structures that store cyber 
capabilities are generally already prepared for these types of attacks due to normal military codes 
and planning. EMPs however can very easily pass through these layers of concrete. Other basic 
protection includes fences and gates to prevent unauthorized entry, locks, traps, laminated glass 
windows, and the aforementioned structural reinforcements.40 However, to protect the equipment 
itself requires much more advanced techniques. These techniques normally consist of shielding, 
faraday cages, waveguides, and different filters, to shield the equipment.41 Overall these 
techniques simply alter the electronic currents from EMPs saving the equipment.  
Another major question in cybersecurity and defense of cyber capabilities is whether to 
act reactively or proactively. The cybersecurity and protection methods against conventional 
attacks just mentioned fall into the category of acting reactively. These techniques fall under the 
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category of traditional warfare. Acting proactively may not fall into the paradigm of traditional 
warfare, but yet again brings up the debate of preventive versus preemptive warfare. As 
mentioned cyber warfare has yet to be considered as factors in many theories of International 
Relations and JWT is one of them. Much research can be done on the effects of cyber warfare on 
JWT, but this paper will only examine what is necessary to be considered in a power transition. 
Many proactive attacks can be made in advance, some even years in advance through both 
software and hardware. These attacks could easily be considered preventive and illegal, which is 
why JWT must be examined.  
The Talinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, published in 
2013, created rules or guidelines for basics of how cyber warfare can and cannot be conducted. 
The main conclusions from this manual are: 
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42 
Overall these key points show that cyber operations can be considered a use of force and the 
similar rules can be applied as they are applied to conventional attacks. Specific sections of JWT 
can also be examined for amore in depth examination as well.  
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The categories of Jus ad Bellum, which is the section of JWT that discusses if a conflict 
is justly initiated, can be used to show how cyber warfare will affect the possibility of a conflict 
in a power transition. Jus ad Bellum can be broken down into five categories: Right Authority, 
Right Intention, Probability of Success, Last Resort, and Proportionality. Cyber warfare could 
have a major effect on PTT, and it will most likely lead to either a mitigation or prevention of a 
conventional conflict between states. 
 Right authority of cyber attacks is difficult because according to right authority only 
states have the legal authority to wage war. Many nonstate actors have committed acts of war, 
i.e. ISIS, but cyber warfare allows even more people the capability to commit acts of war. By 
simply having a computer and some coding, independent actors could easily commit similar acts 
as a state would. Right authority, however, comes from national and international laws, treaties, 
and institutions. A major problem with this is that many states are not members of the same 
international institutions and many have very different national laws when it comes to the case of 
cyber warfare.43 In a possible power transition conflict, one state could consider themselves to 
comply with right authority for cyber warfare attacks; whereas, another state’s laws do not agree. 
 Right intention in JWT states that one can only use or threaten force for a just cause. The 
question is: how just is cyber warfare? The Stuxnet virus, if used correctly, simply attempted to 
stop uranium production in Iran, but does this justify a cyber attack in response? A large scale 
SCADA attack, for example, on a power grid could probably illicit a cyber attack in response, 
but does simple espionage illicit the same response? Or does it simply require diplomatic 
consequences? In a power transition this question will be the most difficult to answer. Right 
intention will be extremely hard to answer, possibly deterring a state from initiating cyber 
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attacks. Without proper knowledge of how to answer this question, it will likely be difficult to 
understand how the victimized state will respond.  
Probability of success discusses that force must not be used in a futile war. Many of these 
again scenarios will not be simple to answer. The major question occurs what is considered a use 
of force when it comes to cyber warfare? For example again, the Stuxnet Virus did not harm any 
human life; it only attempted to stop the production of uranium in Iran, which produces the 
question: is this a use of force and does this even need to be applied to JWT?44 In a power 
transition, probability of success is a major factor. If a challenger enters a conflict with the 
current superpower, it has to make sure it is able to win the conflict. Due to the former 
superiority of the hegemon, this will likely be very difficult to determine. Similarly if a former 
superpower attempts to start a conflict with the new hegemon, is it actually capable of winning 
the conflict? Due to the difficult nature of determining probability of success, it is likely that 
states will use cyber attacks against one another. Since the use of force is difficult to apply to 
cyber attacks, this could very easily replace conventional conflict.  
 Last resort is also very difficult due to the current definition of use of force. In power 
transition, last resort is very important. According to PTT, a conflict normally occurs because a 
challenger is unhappy with the status quo, or a former superpower is attempting to regain its spot 
as the hegemon. Neither of these are fit the right intention category and would likely need 
extensive diplomatic negotiations before a just conflict could even be remotely considered. 
Again cyber attacks will likely mitigate an actual conflict. Both the challenger and the hegemon 
likely will have the cyber capabilities to cripple the other’s basic needs through SCADA attacks, 
which could easily replace a conventional attack and either secure or prevent a power transition. 
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 Proportionality states that the benefits of warfare must outweigh the harms that are 
caused by it. Due to the unpredictable nature of cyber attacks, it will be difficult to determine 
proportionality. However, a large scale SCADA attack could be considered proportional if there 
is limited long-term damage and if it successfully deters further conflict between states.  
 Overall cyber warfare will have a mitigating effect on a conventional conflict, and this 
PTT must be reexamined and updated. Simple economic strength does not translate into military 
capabilities anymore, and military power does not directly translate into international prowess 
anymore. Another negative of PTT is that it merely assumes that a challenger wants to surpass 
the current hegemon. The world system recently left a bipolar world with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union leading us into the current unipolar world. Although PTT was written towards the 
beginning of the Cold War, long before the fall of the Soviet Union, it does not consider a 
continuation of a bipolar or multipolar world. Although it was very likely that only the United 
States or Soviet Union would come out of the Cold War as a sole hegemon, it does not mean the 
world system is destined to be a unipolar world, especially with the current state of globalization. 
Currently the world system is unipolar, but many of the major world powers are entrenched in 
massive military alliances and trade deals as well. These military and economic ties cause 
stronger bonds between states making conflicts much less likely. The question is: would NATO 
back the United States if it entered a conflict with China? Would it risk angering the possible 
new hegemon, or risk causing an all-out conflict between the United States backed alliances 
versus the China back alliances? These questions fail to be answered by the antiquated PTT. 
Although rivalries still occur in the world, such as the current Russian and United States rivalry 
that can be seen in the proxy war in Syria, it does not mean these states cannot work together for 
common goals. For example, global warming and terrorism are issues that cannot be solved by a 
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single unipole; it is going to take a worldwide effort to fix both of these issues. Is it not more 
beneficial for a multipolar world to rule? Another possibility is the creation of regional 
organizations. Already the European Union has shown it can be a force economically. Although 
it has had recent struggles with the strength of the Euro and the situation in Greece, it has 
accomplished the most important goal: peace. PTT must be updated in recent years to consider 
these possibilities. As stated International Relations theories need to begin to consider cyber 
capabilities and until then, the system of international laws will not be sufficient to truly 
determine just acts and the true nature of a possible power transition.   
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